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JURISDICTION OVER LABOR RELATIONS

THE SUPREME COURT, CONGRESS, AND STATE
JURISDICTION OVER LABOR RELATIONS: I!
BERNARD D. MELTZER*
X. SECTION 301 AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AND INTERUNION AGREEMENTS

The dominant congressional objective behind the enactment of Section
301 of the LMRA appears to have been a relatively simple one, namely, to
eliminate certain technical obstacles to suits for breach of collective bargaining agreements. 8 8 Such obstacles had been particularly formidable in actions
at law because of the common law requirement that all members of a union
be joined as parties defendant or parties plaintiff189 and because of the failure
in actions at law to shape the class suit into a device for satisfying or avoiding
restrictive common law requirements. Congress, whose primary purpose was
to facilitate actions against unions, neglected federal-state relationships as
well as the relationship between judicial and administrative competence. As
a result, the congressional effort at simplification has paradoxically increased
the complexities surrounding the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
Subsection 301 (a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce.. ., or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Although the quoted language appears to be only a grant of jurisdiction, it
should be noted that the standards for vicarious responsibility embodied in
t Part I of this article, which is a revision of a paper prepared for the August 1958
meeting of the Council of State Chief Justices, appeared in the January issue. Meltzer,
The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations: I, 59 COLUM.

L. REv. 6 (1959). The revision incorporates selected developments subsequent to that

meeting.
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
188. In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452 (1957), the Court
found the legislative history inconclusive. Commentators have differed on the meaning of
that history as well as on the wisdom of the decision. E.g., compare Bickel & Wellington,
Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv.
1 (1957), with Bunn, Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction to Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements, 43 VA. L. IEV. 1247 (1957), and Feinsinger, Enforcement of Labor
Agreements-A New Era in Collective Bargaining, 43 VA. L. REv. 1261, 1270-71
(1957). Although the disagreement within and outside of the Court cautions against
dogmatism, the extracts from the legislative history set forth in the opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 530, 541-44, are, in my
opinion, persuasive support for a dominantly jurisdictional interpretation of § 301.
189. See Comment, Unions as JuridicalPersons, 66 YALE L.J. 712, 714 (1957).
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subsection 301(b)' 90 constituted substantive regulation-the only unequivocally substantive regulation in the section.
Section 301 raised seven major problems:
(1) Did it merely confer jurisdiction on the federal courts, which (respondeat superior problems aside) were to apply state law to determine liability in actions for breach of collective bargaining agreements? If so, was
section 301 invalid as beyond the judicial power granted by article III of

the federal constitution?
(2) Did section 301 provide for the development by the federal courts
of a new federal law of collective bargaining agreements, thereby avoiding

any constitutional problem under article III?
(3)

If so, was state law displaced in state as well as in federal courts?

(4) If state law was displaced, what was to be the source of the new
federal substantive law?

(5) Was state jurisdiction also pre-empted?
(6) If state law was displaced but state jurisdiction survived, a set of
problems, which may be conveniently described as the converse of the prob1 1
lems raised by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, would result. Three considerations
promised to make such problems especially troublesome in this context: (a)
'the injunction is of great importance as a weapon and as a symbol in labor

disputes; (b) some states lacked restrictions on state injunctive procedures
comparable to those imposed on the federal courts by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act ;192 and (c) the legislative history of section 301 implied that state
remedies, including, apparently, injunctive relief, were to be supplemented
93
rather than superseded.'
(7) Suits for breach of contract would sometimes involve (a) conduct

which could plausibly be claimed to be prohibited or protected under the
LMRA and (b) questions concerning the rights of unions to represent par190. Subsection 301(b) provides:
Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting

commerce . . . and any employer whose activities affect commerce . . . shall

be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be
sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts
of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a
district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any
individual member or his assets.
It is, of course, arguable that both the provisions conferring a juridical status on unions
and those dealing with the enforceability of judgments are "substantive."
191. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
192. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1952).
193. The conference report, in explaining the deletion of a provision which would
have made the failure to abide by an arbitration agreement an unfair labor practice,
stated: "Once parties have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of

that contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the National
Labor Relations Board." H.R. RP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947), quoted
in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452 (1957). See also 353 U.S. at
530, 541-44 (dissenting opinion).
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ticular employees. Since such questions are for some purposes within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, complex adjustments between judicial
194
power and that of the Board would become necessary.
A. The Supreme Court and Section 301
1. Westinghouse. In Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,' 95 the first case requiring the Court to determine
the reach of section 301, the article III question was deferred by a remarkable
exercise in "statutory construction" and by a three-three-two division within
the Court. Westinghouse involved a suit by a union for wages allegedly due
to about 4,000 employees under the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement. There were four separate opinions, none of which secured a
majority. Mr. Justice Frankfurter announced the Court's judgment that
section 301 did not authorize suits by unions to enforce employees' "personal"
claims for wages. His opinion, concurred in by Justices Burton and Minton,
emphasized that section 301 was designed only to provide a federal forum
for the enforcement of state law. To avoid the grave constitutional question
posed by such an interpretation, the section was given a narrow construction,
viz., that it did not extend to the Westinghouse case.
The Chief Justice and Justices Clark and Reed concurred in the holding,
but they rejected the suggestion of a constitutional infirmity in section 301.196
Mr. Justice Douglas in a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Mr. Justice
Black, urged that the union had standing to sue and summarily disposed of
the article III question by asserting that Congress had authorized the federal
courts to develop federal rules for the interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's avoidance of the constitutional issue seemed
to involve a disregard of a reasonable if not compelling construction of subsection 301(b). That subsection provided explicity that a labor organization,
where commerce was affected, "may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf
of the employees whom it representsin the courts of the United States." (Emphasis added.) This language, which surprisingly was not invoked by the
dissenters, could have reasonably been construed as authorizing unions to
enforce rights which in one sense are "personal" to individual employees. 97
Furthermore, a literal construction of the quoted language was supported by
194. The only one of the problems listed in the text which was raised during the
legislative history was the constitutionality of a grant of jurisdiction to federal courts
to enforce state law in non-diversity actions. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
13-14 (minority report) (1947); 93 CONG. Rzc. 4768, 4906 (1947).
195. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
196. Mr. Chief Justice Warren wrote an opinion concurred in by Mr. Justice Clark;
Mr. Justice Reed concurred separately.
197. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a), discussed in Bunn, supra note 188, at 1258.
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several practical considerations. First, there is a close relationship between
the union's enforcement of so-called personal rights by the grievance-arbitration procedure and by court action, where necessary. Secondly, there are
substantial difficulties in separating "individual" and collective interests.108
Thus, some familiar contract clauses, e.g., a provision that employees must be
paid for time spent on union activities or a provision against discrimination
for such activities, plainly involve a coalescence of individual and collective
interests. Indeed, the union, as the individual's representative for the negotiation and administration of the agreement, has an interest in the proper
application of every contract clause. This interest was recognized in other
provisions of the statute even though they were primarily directed at protecting the interests of the individual employee. 1 09 Finally, although court action
by individual employees, where permitted by the collective agreement, 20 0 had
not, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted, been blocked by the procedural obstacles
to actions involving unions, there were other practical obstructions to such
suits. Thus, where restrictive doctrine precluded the use of the class suit as
a device for enforcing small claims, the stake of each potential plaintiff might
be so small in relation to litigation expenses as to lead to the abandonment of
the claim. In view of the foregoing considerations, the line drawn by the Frankfurter opinion seemed a dubious one whether tested by the language of the
statute or by the functional problems involved.
That line, moreover, in no way changed the character of the constitutional
issue which ultimately would be raised by a case involving a union's "collective
interests." If in such a case the constitutionality of section 301 were sustained,
doubt as to the continued vitality of the Westinghouse decision would necessarily result. Westinghouse, insofar as it was based on constitutional considerations, was thus a delaying action. Since the decision involved distinctions dubious in the light of the pertinent functional considerations as well
as the possibility of early obsolescence, it is doubtful that the delaying game
was worth the candle.2 0 1
198. Mr. Justice Frankfurter forcefully developed these two considerations, see 348
U.S. at 456-59 (dissenting opinion), but disregarded them in order to avoid constitutional questions. Compare Kosley v. Goldblatt Bros., 251 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 904 (1958).
199. See the provisos to § 9(a) of the LMRA.
200. For a discussion of the individual's right to bring an action under a collective
bargaining agreement, see Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agree-

ments, 8 LAB. L.J. 850 (1957).
201. When the Court reaches these questions, it may well overrule Westinghouse.
Cf. CommirTEE ON LABOR ARBITRATION OF THE LABOR RELATIONS SECTION OF THE ABA,

(1957), reprinted in 28 Lab. Arb. 913, 917 (1957). The underlying labormanagement disputes in Westinghouse and in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957) (as well as its two companion cases), each involved monetary claims
of individual employees. See Bunn, supra note 188, at 1248-49. Given the elimination
of the constitutional questions raised by §301, there is no apparent justification for
recognizing federal question jurisdiction under § 301 to enforce union demands for arbitration of disputes concerning the individual rights of employees, while denying such
jurisdiction over direct enforcement of such rights. See Note, 59 COLUm. L. Rnv. 153,
REPORT
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2. Lincoln Mills. In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,20 2 the Court
disposed of the constitutional problem tabled in Westinghouse. Its reasoning
provoked thoughtful complaints that it had not candidly faced the difficulties
involved, had dealt cavalierly with evidence of legislative purpose, and had
20 3
substituted dogmatic assertion for reasoned discussion.
Lincoln Mills and its two companion cases 204 each embraced a controversy
about payments due to individual employees under a collective bargaining
agreement prescribing arbitration as the terminal step for settling specified
disputes. In each case the employer, after processing the dispute through the
preliminary stages, declined to submit it to arbitration. In each case the
unions thereupon brought an action in a federal district court for specific
performance of the agreement to arbitrate. They invoked subsection 301 (a)
as the source of federal jurisdiction and relied on that section and the United
States Arbitration Act2° 5 as a source of equity jurisdiction.
The Court's opinion was announced by Mr. Justice Douglas, who spoke
for a majority of five. The Court held that section 301 requires federal courts
to give specific enforcement to agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes. It
relied largely on the legislative history of section 301. This history, although
154-56 (1959). On the contrary, such disparate treatment would be anomalous. It would,
for example, raise a question as to whether § 301 conferred jurisdiction to enforce arbitration awards calling for money payments and other action, such as reinstatement, benefiting
individual employees. Such awards define "individual" rights of employees in the same
way as did the contract provisions in Westinghouse.
Federal courts have reached conflicting results as to their jurisdiction under § 301
to enforce "individual" arbitration awards where arbitration has occurred without prior
judicial compulsion. Compare Textile Workers v. Cone Mills Corp., 166 F. Supp. 654
(M.D.N.C. 1958), with A. L. Kornman Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 43
L.R.R.M. 2581 (6th Cir. Feb. 25, 1959). Where such an award has followed judicial
enforcement of an arbitration clause, jurisdiction to enforce the award has been recognized
as an incident of the court's jurisdiction to enforce obedience to its initial direction to arbitrate. United Steelworkers Union v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 168 F. Supp. 308
(S.D.W. Va. 1958). This position, which prevents frustration, for practical purposes, of
the court's initial decree of specific performance, seems eminently sound. But no statutory
or functional consideration warrants a different jurisdictional result where arbitration
was "voluntary," rather than judicially compelled. On the contrary, judicial refusal to
enforce awards resulting from "voluntary" arbitration might have the unfortunate result
of encouraging immediate recourse to actions for specific performance, instead of persuasion, whenever an adversary questioned arbitrability. Accordingly, the recent decision
of the Sixth Circuit recognizing jurisdiction, under § 301, to enforce an award of vacation pay issued in a voluntary arbitration proceeding is desirable even though that
decision may involve a technical conflict with the logic of Westinghouse. A. L. Kornman
Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, supra. As indicated above, such conflict is not
avoided where arbitration is compelled by judicial decree.
Adherence to Westinghouse may also produce difficulties in state actions as well as
federal diversity actions involving individual rights of employees. Such actions will
raise the question whether state or federal substantive law governs. Bridges v. F. H.
McGraw & Co., 302 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1957), treats state substantive law as controlling.
The Bridges approach could, however, produce inconsistent interpretations of the same
agreement under federal and state law, respectively, and thus threaten the uniformity
which was apparently the basic objective of the Court's ouster of state law in Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra. See 71 HARv. L. REv. 1169 (1958).
202. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
203. See Bickel & Wellington, supra note 188.
204. Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers, 353 U.S. 550 (1957) ; General
Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
205. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1952).
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characterized by the Court as "cloudy and confusing, ' 20 was read as reflecting a federal policy of promoting the inclusion of no-strike clauses in collective
bargaining agreements and providing for the enforceability of such clauses.
Arbitration agreements, the Court urged, are the quid pro quo for no-strike
clauses. Accordingly, section 301 was not merely jurisdictional. "It expresses
a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf
of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained
only in that way. ' 20 7 This policy required specific enforcement of arbitration
clauses.
The Court, having asserted earlier in the opinion that section 301 is a
mandate to the federal courts to fashion a body of law for the enforcement
of collective bargaining agreements, turned to this question again but merely
reiterated its assertion. It thus surmounted any constitutional obstacle under
article III by making it clear that litigation under section 301 would present
a federal question. This phase of its opinion, in striking contrast to the first
phase, did not refer to legislative history; its earlier references did not bear
on this basic problem.
The Court's conclusion that section 301 itself must be read as providing
for specific enforcement of arbitration clauses made it unnecessary to deal with
problems raised by the United States Arbitration Act, which was not mentioned. 20 8 The Court did, however, consider the broad restrictions on the
jurisdiction of federal courts embodied in the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Although conceding that specific enforcement of arbitration clauses would be
barred by a literal reading of that act,20 9 the Court found it inapplicable be206. 353 U.S. at 452.
207. Id. at 455.
208. But cf. General Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S. 547, 548
(1957), affirming 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956), where the Court stated: "We follow in part
a different path than the Court of Appeals, though we reach the same result." Since the
First Circuit had relied on the Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court's language re-enforces
the rejection of the applicability of that act implied by the failure to invoke it in Lincoln
Mills. Compare Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 466 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). The Court may, nevertheless, approve that act as a "guiding analogy"
for judicial disposition of questions concerning the enforceability of arbitration clauses
and awards. See Textile Workers v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 142
(D. Mass. 1953). See also Note, 59 COLUm. L. REV. 153, 173-75 (1959).
In Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter Press, 241 F.2d 787 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957), § 301 was held not to authorize specific enforcement
of an agreement to submit to arbitration issues as to the terms to be included in a new
contract, principally on the ground that such enforcement is not authorized by the United
States Arbitration Act. The Supreme Court's failure to rely on that act in Lincoln Mills
would appear to eliminate that ground for distinguishing in actions for specific enforcement between clauses providing, respectively, for "grievance" and "economic" arbitration. That distinction, which is not warranted by the language of § 301, has properly been
questioned. See 70 NARv. L. REv. 365 (1956) ; 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 284, 288-94 (1957).
But cf. 105 U. PA. L. REV. 269 (1956). Compare Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v.
Potter Press, supra, with Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. Employes v. Pittsburgh
Rys., 393 Pa. 219, 142 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 882 (1958) (enforcing under
Pennsylvania Arbitration Act an agreement to arbitrate amendments to a retirement
plan established by contract).
209. See § 7, 47 Stat. 71 (1932). 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1952).
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cause such enforcement was not "part and parcel of the abuses against which
the Act was aimed."2 10 It found further justification in Section 8 of NorrisLaGuardia, which endorses the settlement of disputes through the use of
arbitration by denying injunctive relief to any person who has not made
"every reasonable effort" to settle a labor dispute by arbitration.2 1 1 Accordingly, the Court concluded, there was "no justification in policy for restricting
§ 301(a) to damage suits, leaving specific performance of a contract to
arbitrate grievance disputes to the inapposite procedural requirements of
[the Norris-LaGuardia]

. . . Act."212

Mr. Justice Burton, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, concurred separately.
They found federal power to fashion an "appropriate federal remedy," i.e.,
specific performance, in section 301 itself and in inherent equitable powers
"nurtured by a congressional policy to encourage and enforce labor arbitration
in industries affecting commerce."21 3 Their crucial difference with the majority
lay in their conclusion that the federal courts should apply state substantive
law and should look to federal law only in connection with remedial questions.
They surmounted article III problems by approving a concept of "protective
214
jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a lengthy and powerful dissent supplemented by an extensive appendix containing extracts from the legislative
history. He urged that the Court's transformation of a plainly procedural
or jurisdictional section into a mandate for the invention of a body of substantive federal law had ignored both the language of section 301 and its
legislative history. He urged also that even if such a mandate were inferred,
the relevant federal law, the United States Arbitration Act, excluded specific
enforcement of arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements. Finally,
he rejected the applicability of the protective jurisdiction concept to this case.
He concluded that section 301, as an exclusively jurisdictional provision which
was to operate in the absence of diversity of citizenship or a federal question,
was beyond the federal judicial power conferred by article III of the Constitution.
210. 353 U.S. at 458.
211. See also § 203(d) of the LMRA, which also endorses the use of arbitration for
the settlement of grievance disputes.
212. 353 U.S. at 458. (Footnote omitted.)
213. Id. at 460 (concurring opinion). (Footnote omitted.)
214. That concept has been invoked to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to
apply state law in actions involving federally-created instrumentalities. See 353 U.S. at
473-77 (Frankfurter, 3., dissenting). Such jurisdiction has been defended in the context
of labor relations on the ground that it is necessary for the protection of an extensive body
of federal labor regulation. See Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements
Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 YALE L.J. 167, 191 (1956). Senator Taft during the
hearings on the proposed legislation defended federal jurisdiction on grounds quite similar
to this protective jurisdiction concept, although he did not invoke it by that name. See
Hearings on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22 Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1947).
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B. The Role of State Law and State Jurisdiction
A comprehensive analysis of the rival positions advanced in Lincoln Mills
would be a tempting exercise. But such an analysis, which has already been
ably made, 21 5 would take us too far from our main concern, which is the
unresolved problems regarding the role of state law and state jurisdiction
in the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
The Court in Lincoln Mills declared:
. . the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal
law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national
*

labor laws. . . . The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem. . . . Federal interpretation
of the federal law will govern, not state law. . . . But state law,

if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order
to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy ....

Any

state law applied, however, will be absorbed as2 federal
law and will
16
not be an independent source of private rights.
The Court spoke in the context of an action filed in a federal court pursuant to subsection 301(a). Nevertheless, its language suggests that federal
law will also control actions which could have been filed in a federal court,
but which were filed in a state forum. The federal law governing collective
bargaining agreements plainly falls within the "laws of the United States"
which are binding on state courts under the supremacy clause of the Constitution.21 Furthermore, given the Court's general emphasis on the desirability of uniform regulation of labor relations and its particular emphasis in
Lincoln Mills on the federal interest in the integrity of collective bargaining
agreements, it is highly unlikely that the Court would sanction the development of two competing systems of substantive regulation applicable to actions
on collective bargaining agreements.
215. See articles cited note 188 mipra.
216. 353 U.S. at 456-57. This quotation contrasts with the Court's approach in
Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953), and in Black v. Cutter
Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 298 (1956). In Koppal, the Court held that state courts have jurisdiction over actions for wrongful discharge brought by employees subject to the Railway
Labor Act and may in such actions apply state doctrines as to exhaustion of administrative remedies. In Cutter, the Court, with three Justices dissenting, dismissed as dicta
broad statements by the California Supreme Court that an arbitration award reinstating
a Communist on the ground that her discharge violated a "just cause" provision of a
collective bargaining agreement was contrary to public policy. It found that no federal
question was raised because the decision involved only "California's construction of a
local contract under local law . . . ." 351 U.S. at 299. It is an interesting commentary
on the pace of development in the law of labor relations that Mr. Justice Douglas, who
subsequently wrote for the Court in Lincoln Mills, did not in his Cutter dissent challenge
that contention of the Court, but relied instead on the first and fourteenth amendments.
217. It has been suggested that in state actions state law will govern "collateral
questions of substantive law," such as the general law of contract and general defenses
(such as fraud, etc.). Pirsig, The Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act and the Lincoln
Mills Case, 42 MINN. L. REv. 333, 374 (1958). Although that position is a familiar
incident of federal question jurisdiction, the general law of contract and general defenses
have so crucial an impact on the existence of a "federal right" under a collective bargaining
agreement that it is unlikely that such matters will be controlled by state law.
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The Court's opinion does not make it clear whether state jurisdiction
over section 301 actions, 218 as well as state substantive law, is foreclosed.
219
Such jurisdictional pre-emption has been urged by some commentators.
22
0
But whatever the merits of such a result as a matter of policy,
section 301
does not provide that federal jurisdiction should be exclusive, and its legislative history suggests that state jurisdiction was to be supplemented rather
than superseded. Thus, unless the Court is prepared to sanction what would
seem to be a free-wheeling inroad on traditional state jurisdiction, it will
recognize parallel state jurisdiction over section 301 actions. 221
The recognition of such jurisdiction, coupled with the controlling effect
of a federal "substantive law," will involve complex adjustments between the
state and federal systems. The converse of the difficulties which have surrounded the Erie doctrine in the federal courts will, as already indicated, be
transplanted into the state system. What is the line between "substantive"
and "procedural" law for this purpose? May states use the machinery prescribed by their arbitration acts to enforce an agreement to arbitrate or an
arbitration award ?222 May state courts deny remedies, such as specific enforce218. Actions to enforce collective bargaining agreements brought in state courts are

not strictly "section 301 actions"; they are actions brought under state jurisdictional

authorizations and not pursuant to § 301. "Section 301 actions" will, however, be used
here to include actions which could have been filed in a federal court pursuant to § 301
even though they are filed in a state court.
219. See, e.g., Mendelsohn, supra note 214, at 189.
220. For discussion of the competing considerations see Notes, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 153,
165 (1959), 57 COLUM. L. REv. 1123, 1132-34 (1957).
221. After Lincoln Mills. the California Supreme Court held that § 301 did not foreclose state jurisdiction. McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958) ; accord, Coleman
Co. v. International Union, UAW, 181 Kan. 969, 317 P.2d 831 (1957); Steinberg v.
Mendel Rosenzweig Fine Furs, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 611, 167 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1957) ;
Garment Mfrs. Ass'n v. Garment Workers, 41 L.R.R.M. 2536 (Pa. C.P. 1957). For preLincoln Mills decisions to the same effect see, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. International
Union, UAW, 93 Ohio App. 139, 108 N.E.2d 211 (1952), appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio St.
555, 110 N.E.2d 424 (1953) ; General Bldg. Contractors' Ass'n v. Local 542, 370 Pa. 73,
87 A.2d 250 (1952).
222. Since such machinery would appear to be "procedural," an affirmative answer
would seem to be clearly indicated. Compare Judge Wyzanski's suggestion that the
United States Arbitration Act should serve as "a guiding analogy" in § 301 actions.
Textile Workers v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 142 (D. Mass. 1953).
But the availability of such machinery would presumably be governed by the "federal law"
concerning arbitrability or the arbitrator's jurisdiction. Similarly, the finality of an award
would appear to be governed by the federal law as to the basis for attacking an award
and the requirements of fair procedure in arbitration. Such matters go to the
heart of the federally recognized right to enforcement of arbitration provisions and
would accordingly appear to be matters of "substance" controlled by federal standards.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which has frequently been faced with
questions of arbitrability in § 301 actions, in Local 201, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v.
General Elec. Co., 262 F.2d 265, 267-68 (1st Cir. 1959), outlined a useful general approach
to such questions, viz.: (1) The district court must determine'the issue of arbitrability,
i.e., whether the respondent has violated an agreement to arbitrate the underlying dispute.
Although this proposition referred to actions for specific enforcement, it is equally
applicable to actions on the award. (2) Because arbitration deserves judicial encouragement, ambiguity should normally be resolved in favor of arbitrability. (3) Where the
parties have committed a particular issue to arbitration, arbitrability should not be denied
because it seems clear that the contract does not entitle the moving party to any relief.
Compare New Bedford Defense Prods. Div. v. Local 1113, UAW, 258 F.2d 522, 526
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ment of arbitration clauses, granted by the federal courts? May the state
courts grant remedies, such as the specific enforcement of no-strike clauses,
which may be denied in the federal system? Such problems, which will be
discussed below, will be puzzling even after more content has been given to
the federal law, which, in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's phrase, is still largely
"in the bosom of the judiciary. '223 But during the developmental period,
which promises to be long, state courts will be bedeviled by questions concerning both the content and the authoritative sources of federal law. How,
for example, does a decision by a federal district court sitting within or
outside of a given state rank with a decision of the highest state court ?22,4
In addition to these special problems, the state courts will have problems
in common with the federal courts while the federal law is being developed.
Under Lincoln Mills, federal law governing collective bargaining agreements
is to be derived from the policy of our national labor laws. Federal labor
laws and other federal laws which impinge on labor relations, such as anti221
trust laws, are complex and often reflect policies not easy to accommodate.
Furthermore, except for a narrow range of issues, 226 neither the LMRA nor
other national labor laws supply a meaningful guide for the development
of a new body of jurisprudence to govern the enforcement of collective agreements. It thus seems likely that the new federal law will be distilled largely
from state court doctrines, which in turn are derived largely from commercial
law analogies reshaped to some extent to reflect the distinctive elements of
the collective bargaining relationship. The large and growing body of published arbitration awards will presumably be another source of guidance.
Whatever the ultimate content of the federal law, it seems likely that during
its developmental stage state courts will identify their own precedents as
"federal law" unless the precedents appear to be unsound or incompatible
with purposes implied by the LMRA or other federal statutes.
Soon after the decision in Lincoln Mills, several of the major problems
flowing from the Court's approach were presented to the California Supreme
(1st Cir. 1958), with International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App.
Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1st Dep't), affd mein., 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
The decisions of the First Circuit bearing on the third point are, however, far from clear.
See ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, 1958 PROCEEDINGS 85-89.
223. 353 U.S. at 465 (dissenting opinion).
224. See generally HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SvsTEm 628-30 (1953).
225. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). The problem of
accommodating § 301 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act will be especially acute. See text
accompanying notes 237-41 infra.
226. Section 301 makes it clear (1) that the union may sue and be sued as an entity;
(2) that unions and employers are to be responsible for the acts of their "agents," without, however, clarifying elastic standards of vicarious responsibility; and (3) that a
collective bargaining agreement imposes legally enforceable duties whose breach may
be remedied by a suit for damages. Other provisions of the LMRA will bear on the basic
validity of the agreement involved or of particular clauses, such as those embodying union
security arrangements.

HeinOnline -- 59 Colum. L. Rev. 278 1959

1959]

JURISDICTION OVER LABOR RELATIONS

Court in McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters.227
In McCarroll,a labor union had entered into a collective bargaining agreement
containing a no-strike clause and a conventional grievance and arbitration
clause. The union, claiming that the employer had engaged in allegedly illegal
labor contracting and had not conformed to safety standards, called a strike.
The Supreme Court of California, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the grant
of a preliminary injunction against the union's violation of its no-strike pledge.
The court, in an opinion by Justice Traynor, concluded that the Norris22s
LaGuardia Act would have precluded injunctive relief by a federal court a conclusion which is, however, open to question under the rationale of
Lincoln Mills.229 Although recognizing the controlling effect of federal substantive law, the court decided that a state is free to grant a remedy unavailable
in a federal forum.
The problem of disparate state and federal equitable remedies for contract violation involves a dilemma which cannot be resolved in a manner
compatible with both the implications of Lincoln Mills and the legislative
history of section 301-a dilemma which annotates Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
warning in Lincoln Mills that the Court's approach "is more likely to discombobulate than to compose." 230 Although the Court in Lincoln Mills unfortunately did not set forth the policy considerations supporting the supersession of state substantive law, presumably it deemed the uniformity which
might ultimately be achieved as justifying the labor pains which would
surround the birth of federal substantive law.
The importance which the Court apparently attached to uniformity is
a basis for a strong argument that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, although literally
applicable only to federal courts, should also control state enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements. The availability of a labor injunction has
a crucial impact on the balance of power between the contending forces.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the much debated Hutcheson case 231
gave far-reaching substantive effect to the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the
federal system. Presumably, the uniformity which the Court seeks is not a
wooden uniformity of "substantive" rather than "remedial" law, but a
uniformity meaningful in the light of the interests at stake. Such meaningful
uniformity would be frustrated by a doctrine permitting either forum shopping
227. 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958), 58 COLUM.
L. REv. 278. See also Ruppert v. Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 582, 148 N.E.2d 129, 131,
170 N.Y.S.2d 785, 788 (1958), discussed in note 233 infra.
228. This position was recently adopted in A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Union,
250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958). All of the opinions in
United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), decided prior to Taft-Hartley, assumed that
Norris-LaGuardia generally barred an injunction against the breach of a no-strike clause.
229. See Comment, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 496, 501 (1958); 71 HARv. L. REV. 1172,
1175 (1958).
230. 353 U.S. at 464 (dissenting opinion).
231. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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for the purpose of securing an injunction in labor disputes2 32 or disparate
233
results in the federal and state courts.
In this connection, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of America,23 4 is significant. In Bernhardt, the Court held
that a federal court, required by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins to follow state "substantive" law in a diversity action, was barred from specifically enforcing an
agreement to arbitrate when that remedy was not available under the applicable
state law. It found the remedy "outcome-determinative" within the meaning
of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.23 5 Conversely, under section 301, the desire
for uniformity, which apparently moved the Court to fashion a controlling
federal law, would appear to require the states to deny injunctive relief if
23 6
it is not available under federal law.

Although the Supreme Court of California in McCarroll expressed doubts
as to the authority of Congress to require state courts to withhold state
remedies in section 301 litigation,2 37 such doubts seem unwarranted. Congress
may lack authority to impose general regulations on state procedure, but the
supremacy clause together with the commerce clause would support the
complete ouster of state jurisdiction and would also appear to authorize a
congressional mandate that strikes affecting commerce, although giving rise
to damages, should be free from state, as well as federal, injunctive relief.
If, however, the implications of the policy of uniformity were followed,
a paradoxical frustration of the purpose behind section 301 would result. The
232. In damage actions, the practical importance of the question is reduced by the
plaintiff's right to sue in a federal court and by the defendant's power to remove state
actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (1952) provides that "any civil action brought in a State
court of which the [federal] district courts . . . have original jurisdiction, may be removed
by the defendant . . . to the district court of the United States . . . ." But in injunction
actions, the defendant's attempt to remove may be blocked by the argument that the
action is not removable since the Norris-LaGuardia Act has deprived the federal courts
of "jurisdiction' to enjoin strikes. Some federal courts have taken this position. Parsons

v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 18 CCH Lab. Cas. 165705 (E.D. Okla. 1950) ; Associated Tel. Co. v.

Communication Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (alternative holding).
See generally Wollett & Wellington, Federali and Breach of the Labor Agricesnt,
7 STAN. L. Ray. 445, 463 n.101 (1955) ; 20 U. Cnii. L. REV. 304, 308-09 (1953).
233. If the desirability of federal-state uniformity is accepted, the compatibility of
state injunctions with federal policy should not be affected by the fact that injunctive
relief was originally awarded by an arbitrator rather than a court. But cf. Ruppert v.
Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576,148 N.E.2d 129,170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958), 58 COLuor.L. REV. 908,

sustaining judicial enforcement of an arbitrator's "injunction" against a slowdown, even
though conceding that the New York anti-injunction law would deprive the courts of
power to issue such an injunction independently of arbitration. The basic question
presented by the Ruppert situation appears to be, not which tribunal had initially decreed
injunctive relief, but whether the agreement to arbitrate would remove injunctive relief
from the federal policy embodied in Norris-LaGuardia. See id. at 582, 148 N.E.2d at 131,
170 N.Y.S.2d at 788, 58 CoLum. L. REV. 908, 910-11 (1958).
234. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
235. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
236. It is not clear whether states which deny injunctive relief under "baby" NorrisLaGuardia acts could be compelled to grant such relief in § 301 cases if it were available
in the federal courts. See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUm. L. REv. 489, 507 (1954); 71 HAmv. L. REy. 1172, 1174 (1958). If such relief
were clearly available in the federal courts, the practical significance of this question
would be lessened because of the plaintiff's privilege to sue in a federal court.
237. 49 Cal. 2d at 61-63, 315 P.2d at 331-32.
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pertinent legislative history suggests that the primary objective of Congress
was to secure increased union compliance with no-strike clauses by facilitating the recovery of damages for the breach of such clauses.2 38 Although
Congress deliberately declined to lift the restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act from the federal courts, neither section 301 nor its legislative history
discloses a purpose to interfere with state procedures or state remedies. On
the contrary, the legislative history suggests that reliance was to be placed
on the normal processes of the courts, 2 3 9 which included injunctive relief in
those states which lacked "baby" Norris-LaGuardia acts or which had construed them as inapplicable to contract disputes. 240 Furthermore, a damage
suit is often a much less effective stimulus to union responsibility than injunctive relief. It would, as Justice Traynor suggested in McCarroll,241 be an
ironic twist to read section 301 as excluding state injunctions against breach
of a no-strike clause.
The Supreme Court may escape from the dilemma illustrated by
McCarroll and all of the converse-of-Erie problems by holding, contrary to
McCarroll, that state jurisdiction over section'301 actions, as well as state
law, is pre-empted. Complete federal pre-emption would be a logical sequel
to Lincoln Mills and an escape from some of the problems it has spawned.
But, as indicated above, it would, in the absence of new legislation, appear
to involve an impairment of state power unwarranted by either the language
or the history of section 301.
C. Accommodation of Judicialand Administrative Competence
If state competence survives, state, as well as federal, courts will be
faced with subtle and complex problems when contract actions raise issues
which for some purposes are within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. Such issues
may arise, for example, from contentions (1) that the alleged contractual
violations were or might be deemed to be conduct prohibited by the LMRA;
or (2) that the alleged violations were justified by the plaintiff's antecedent
unfair labor practices and were consequently protected by the federal
statute; or (3) that the validity of the underlying contract or of the particular
contractual provision in question, or that the right to maintain a contract
action, depends on statutory or administrative criteria which peculiarly involve
the Board's expertise. Such issues require the state courts and the lower
federal courts, initially, and the Supreme Court, ultimately, to make adjust238. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1957).
239. Id. at 452. Senator Taft indicated that § 301 would not displace state equitable
remedies. Hearings on H.R. 4908 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on

Education and Labor, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1946).
240. For discussion of conflicting state cases see Rice, A Paradox of Our National
Labor Law, 34 MARg. L. Rxv. 233, 242-47 (1951); Note, 37 VA. L. Rxv. 739, 744-50

(1951).

241. 49 Cal. 2d at 63-64, 315 P.2d at 332.
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ments between two putatively competent jurisdictions, that of the courts

over contract actions and that of the Board over unfair labor practices,
representation matters, and protected activities.
The Supreme Court has not yet spoken on these matters; the decisions
of other courts are confusing 242 and conflicting ;243 the commentators are also
divided. 244 A good deal of the difficulty results from a failure to recognize
the different responsibilities of courts and arbitrators, on the one hand, and
of the NLRB, on the other, with respect to both the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements and the policing of the bargaining process.
1. Competence over disputes which involve an overlap between statutory
and contractualprohibitions. The enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, including the award of appropriate compensatory and preventive
relief, devolves on courts and arbitrators and not on the Board. The Board
is the proctor of the bargaining process and not of the bargain. Nevertheless,
the Board, in discharging its statutory responsibility to insure good faith
bargaining, will sometimes be faced with questions concerning the scope of
the bargain. Thus, Section 8 of the LMRA provides that the duty to bargain
bars the use of economic power to secure the modification of a current contract provision during the term of the contract. Similarly, the Board has
held that a unilateral repudiation of the existing terms of an agreement, or
an employer's unilateral change in the conditions of employment, constitutes
242. See Textile Workers v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529, 533 (4th Cir. 1951).
But cf. Independent Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 235 F.2d 401 (3d
Cir. 1956).
243. For illustrative cases affirming judicial competence notwithstanding an overlap
between contractual and statutory prohibitions, see Lodge 12, Dist. 37, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 880 (1958) (specifically enforcing arbitration clause); United Elec. Workers v.
Worthington Corp., 236 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1956) (district court has jurisdiction to
enforce arbitration award) ; Independent Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard Oil Co.,
235 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1956) (district court has jurisdiction to enforce agreement to
bargain). For cases denying judicial competence see United Elec. Workers v.
General Elec. Co., 231 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956)
(union's complaint alleged that employer's unilateral adoption of new discharge rule
constituted a violation of both the agreement and the duty to bargain); United
Ass'n of Journeymen v. Marchese, 81 Ariz. 162, 302 P.2d 930 (1956), opinion suppleinented and rehearing denied, 82 Ariz. 30, 307 P.2d 1038 (1957). Although United lec.
Workers v. General Elec. Co., supra, was "distinguished" in United Elec. Workers v.
Worthington Corp., supra at 370, the only basis for distinction would appear to be that
the plaintiff's complaint in General Electric explicitly charged an unfair labor practice
whereas the charge was merely implied in Worthington. Despite the significance
attached by the Supreme Court to the moving party's allegation of a federal unfair labor
practice in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 481 (1955), this essentially
formal difference appears to be a dubious basis for disparate jurisdictional results under
§ 301. The judicial competence to deal with contract violations recognized by that section is not subordinated to the Board's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices. Such
subordination would, in my view, be unfortunate. In any event, it seems clear that such
subordination should be based on more substantial considerations than the form of the
pleadings.
For extensive discussions of cases dealing with judicial competence in the overlap
context, see Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional
Problems, 57 COLUm. L. Rxv. 52 (1957); Note, 69 HARv. L. REv. 725 (1956).
244. Compare Mendelsohn, supra note 214, at 186, with Dunau, supra note 243.
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a violation of the duty to bargain.2 45 Charges of violations of that duty sometimes require the Board to determine the scope of any explicit or implied
agreement sanctioning or excluding unilateral action.2 46 But such determinations reflect the Board's concern with the bargaining process rather than any
plenary Board jurisdiction over breaches of the agreement as such.
Although the LMRA in general commits jurisdiction to remedy such
breaches to the courts, collective bargaining agreements normally contain
arbitration clauses; consequently, claims of breach of agreement are for the
most part resolved by recourse to arbitration rather than the courts.2 4 7 Congress was familiar with, and endorsed, the use of the arbitration mechanism24 -an endorsement which was generously implemented by the Court
2 49

in Lincoln Mills.

The destruction of judicial competence on the ground of contractual and
statutory overlap would ignore the difference in the respective functions of
the Board, the courts, and arbitration. It would also appear to frustrate the
purpose of Congress-to commit actions for breach of contract to the courts
or to arbitration when called for by the contract. Finally, such destruction
of judicial competence would give rise to substantial practical disadvantages.
It would complicate judicial enforcement by requiring courts to test their
jurisdiction against a complex body of NLRB precedents not directly
relevant to issues of contract administration. It would deprive litigants of
a judicial remedy, which is often more expeditious and comprehensive,
because of the possible existence of a Board remedy which might not be forthcoming and which, even if it were, might be inadequate. Thus, for example,
although the Board may hold that some breaches of a no-strike pledge are
violations of subsection 8(b) (3), it lacks power to grant damages to the
employer-a vital point ignored in a recent California case because of undue
245. See, e.g., Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 121 N.L.R.B. No. 113 (Sept. 23,
1958); General Motors Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforced per curiam, 179 F.2d
221 (2d Cir. 1950). See generally Bowman, An Enployer's Unilateral Action-An
Unfair Labor Practice?, 9 VAND. L. REv. 487 (1956).
246. For an illustration of the overlap between questions as to the content of the
bargain and questions concerning violations of the duty to bargain, see United Elec.
Workers v. General Elec. Co., 231 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956),
discussed in Dunau, supra note 243, at 57, 78.
247. The most important exception involves disputes as to breach of no-strike
clauses. For a collection of cases on the arbitrability of such disputes, which sometimes
turns on the breadth of the arbitration clause, see McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist.
Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 67 n.1, 315 P.2d 322, 334 n.1 (1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 932 (1958). See also Armstrong-Norwalk Rubber Corp. v. Local 283, United
Rubber Workers, 167 F. Supp. 817 (D. Conn. 1958).
248. See note 211 supra and accompanying text.
249. The Court in another context has recognized that, in enforcing the duty to
bargain, consideration should be given "to the philosophy of bargaining as worked out
in the labor movement in the United States." NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343
U.S. 395, 408 (1952), quoting from Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 346 (1944). Recognition of that "philosophy," including the
widespread reliance on arbitration in resolving issues of contract administration, would
be equally appropriate in adjusting judicial and administrative jurisdiction.
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preoccupation with the abstractions of pre-emption. 2 ° Furthermore, the
allegation of overlap urged to defeat judicial competence will, in Board proceedings, presumably be replaced by defenses designed to avoid the remedy
whose availability was invoked to oust the courts. Thus, the possible existence of two theoretical remedies might in practice paradoxically result in
the denial of any remedy. This anomaly would be automatic in cases within
the no-man's land.
The difficulties are illustrated by McCarroll. There, the collective agreement provided, inter alia, that (1) the union would furnish "skilled and
competent" workmen to the employer; (2) the employer would have the
right to transfer workmen from the jurisdiction of one local to another;
and (3) there would be no strikes during the life of the agreement, but all
disputes over its interpretation or application would be settled by the grievance procedure and arbitration. The employer's complaint alleged that the
union had violated the agreement by the following conduct: (1) it had supplied incompetent workers; (2) it had refused to permit transfers allowed
by the contract; and (3) it had brought about a strike, which it sought to
justify on the spurious (as shown by supporting affidavits) grounds that the
employer was a labor contractor and was violating state safety regulations.
The California Supreme Court, seeking to avoid the problems raised by
a possible overlap between contractual and statutory violations, concluded
that the union's conduct could not "reasonably be deemed an unfair labor
practice ... ,"251 This conclusion is, however, extremely doubtful since

the union's disregard of its obligations with respect to the supplying and
transfer of workmen, coupled with its strike, might well have constituted
unilateral repudiation in violation of subsection 8(b)(3) .2r2 The uncer250. Grunwald-Marx Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 331 P.2d 1030 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). The trial court, after directing a union
to abide by its arbitration agreement, confirmed the resultant arbitration award assessing
money damages against the union. The appellate court reversed. It emphasized that the
employer, prior to his action to enforce the agreement to arbitrate, had filed a charge
of a § 8(b) (3) violation with the Board. It predicated pre-emption on the ground that
that charge was well-founded, but also urged that if the Board rejected that charge and
denied a remedy, the grant of a judicial remedy would involve a conflict with the Board's
disposition. The court's approach was based on the mistaken assumption that a union's
breach of agreement and the unfair labor practice defined by § 8(b) (3) are coextensive,
rather than independent, sources of liability. Furthermore, despite the employer's initial
recourse to the Board, his inability to recover money damages in a Board proceeding,
together with the absence of any proof of detrimental reliance by the union, should have
excluded the notion of "election of remedies," which notion may have been behind the
court's emphasis on the employer's resort to the Board.
251. 49 Cal. 2d at 57, 315 P.2d at 328.
252. See authorities cited note 245 supra. Furthermore, the union's demand for
cessation of "labor contracting" may well have related to a matter not subject to
mandatory bargaining. Accordingly, the union's insistence on negotiating on that subject
as a condition of any agreement would have constituted a violation of § 8 (b)(3).
Cf. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). Finally, the
union's apparent failure to specify its demands might also have constituted such a violation.
If, as the court urged, the union plainly did not unilaterally repudiate existing
contract provisions, its conduct may have constituted a demand for the addition of new
contractual terms, rather than the amendment of existing terms. So viewed, the union's
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tainties in McCarroll and in similar situations 253 concerning the availability
in fact of the putative NLRB remedy suggest that denial of judicial competence because of a possible overlap between statutory and contractual violations might be followed by a denial of relief under the LMRA.
Despite the possibility of such a remedial vacuum and the general inadequacy of Board remedies, Garner254 has been urged as the basis for ousting
judicial competence in the overlap situation. 2 5 This suggestion overlooks,
however, several critical differences between the contract context and the
situations where Garner has been invoked to oust regulation duplicating or
supplementing the LMRA. Where such regulation is involved, and where
the Board has not acted, the pre-emption inquiry typically is whether peaceful
labor-management activity affecting commerce is involved.2 5 6 If so, state
regulation is excluded without any need for the courts to delineate precisely
the prohibitions or protections flowing from the LMRA. But such an approach
strike, the no-strike pledge and Borg-Warner aside, might have constituted protected
activity. See NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957); NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co.,
196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952); cf. 58 COLtm. L. REv. 278, 281 (1958). But if a strike,
although permitted by §8(d) absent a no-strike clause, violates such a clause, the
existence of this contractual violation would (or should) divest the strike of any
statutory protection and would (or should) permit the courts to grant the remedies
appropriate under §301.
253. Similar uncertainties are illustrated by differences between the Board and the
reviewing courts with respect to union-sponsored strikes after union grievances have
been denied in arbitration or prior to such arbitration. In Westmoreland Coal Co.,
117 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1957), the Board found a violation of § 8(b) (3) when a union
whose grievance had been denied by an arbitrator struck without complying with the
notice and other requirements prescribed by § 8(d). Its decision was, however, reversed.
Local 9735, UMW v. NLRB, 258 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The reversal seems sound
because the master contract left the disputed issue to collective bargaining at the individual mines. Accordingly, the arbitration award held only that in the absence of a
newly bargained standard the employer was free to take the action involved; it did not
define the standard to be controlling during the term of the contract. Thus, the union
was privileged to strike for the standard which it preferred.
In Boone County Coal Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957), the Board held that a
union had violated §8(b)(3) when it struck over grievances cognizable under the
contractually-prescribed grievance arbitration procedure, without resorting to that procedure. Again, its decision was reversed, on the ground that the explicit rejection of
a no-strike obligation in the contract made the provisions for grievance adjustment
"a gentleman's agreement." International Union, UMW v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C.
Cir. 1958). But cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230
F.2d 576 (lst Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed per stipulation, 352 U.S. 802 (1956).
The Board's intervention in cases like Westmoreland and Boone is open to criticism
because it involves the Board in questions of contract administration which are beyond
its responsibilities. See Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1401,
1438 (1958). But the Board's intervention in the Boone context seems at least as justifiable as its assumption of similar responsibilities, such as the prohibition of unilateral
changes or repudiation, which involve it in policing the bargain under the guise of
policing the bargaining process. The grievance and arbitration procedure, even though
the obligation to use it is voluntarily assumed, is an integral and a usual part of the
bargaining process. Cf. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.
1947). Accordingly, the Board's conclusion that respect for such obligations must be
enforced to protect the integrity of the bargaining process is defensible.
254. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
255. See United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 231 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956); United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Marchese, 81 Ariz.
162, 168, 302 P.2d 930, 934 (1956).
256. This formulation is based on the broad pre-emption implications of Garner.
See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations: I, 59 COLUm. L. Rev. 6, 16-17, 19 (1959).
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applied to contract questions would undermine the basic purpose of section
301. Contract violations typically involve peaceful conduct which under the
broad Garner formula would be beyond judicial competence. Consequently,
courts cannot in the contract context adopt the approach suggested by Garner
unless they are to abdicate the responsibilities apparently imposed on them by
section 301. To avoid such abdication, courts, when faced with claims of preemption based on overlap, presumably would reject such claims or would consider whether the LMRA prohibited (or might reasonably prohibit) the alleged
contractual breach. The latter approach would, however, multiply occasions
requiring courts in the first instance to interpret the LMRA, and it was
precisely such encroachments on the Board's duty of primary interpretation
which Garner condemned. On the other hand, by disregarding overlap in the
contract context, courts would-in accordance with Garner-be relieved of
the necessity of applying the LMRA.
The foregoing suggestion could be dismissed as a tour de force, which
excludes the need for scrutinizing the LMRA only because the "conflict"
which Garner sought to avoid is to be tolerated in the contract context. But
the relevant considerations suggest that in that context the "conflict" is either
unreal or peripheral and that Garner is of doubtful applicability.
Garner involved not the enforcement of obligations voluntarily assumed
by the parties but rather the enforcement of obligations imposed by the coercive
power of the state.25r The failure of the LMRA to deal expressly with the
exercise of such coercive power contrasts sharply with its explicit sanction
of judicial competence over contract actions-a competence which the statute
does not purport to qualify in situations involving overlapping remedies.
Finally, judicial action, even if it reaches conduct prohibited by the statute,
will involve only a different, and a legislatively sanctioned, method
of
vindicating the national policy. If, per contra, the defendant's conduct is not so
prohibited, there is no room for the approach suggested by Garner, under
which activity not prohibited by the federal act is to be free from supplementary governmental prohibitions. Section 301 means that supplementary
prohibitions imposed by collective bargaining agreements are in general to
be judicially enforced even though they may curtail activities which, in the
absence of contractual restrictions, would be accorded statutory protection.
In view of the essential differences between the problems involved in Garner
and those raised by the "exercise of the power conferred by section 301,
overlap between contractual and statutory prohibitions does not appear to
warrant curtailment of judicial power to enforce collective bargaining agreements.
257. See Dunau, supra note 243, at 53-54, for an able and extensive discussion of
the differences betwveen Garner and oyerlap in the context of § 301.
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This conclusion is re-enforced by the decisions of the Court in other
contexts. Thus, the Court has held that judicial enforcement of Section 303
of the LMRA is completely independent of Board enforcement of the parallel
provisions of subsection 8(b) (4) .25s Section 303 imposes liability in damages
for violations of the complex provisions of subsection 8(b) (4), which, as to
permanent preventive relief, are within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction. The
case for independent judicial competence as to contract enforcement under
section. 301 is considerably stronger in view of the fact that the statute generally
entrusts such questions to the courts rather than to the Board.
The overtones of Gonzales2 59 point in the same direction. It will be
recalled that the Court there emphasized that the crux of the action was contractual and that a comprehensive remedy for breach of contract should not be
displaced merely because of a possibility of overlap with a Board proceeding.
The fact that the "contract" there involved (a union constitution) was not
covered by section 301 does not weaken Gonzales' implications for the comparable problems raised under that section. The dominating consideration both
as to section 301 agreements and the "contract" embodied in union constitutions
is that both types of agreements are to be enforced by the courts. If overlap
does not oust the courts of jurisdiction over the membership contract, it should
not destroy judicial competence over the collective bargaining agreement.
Indeed, in view of the explicit mandate of section 301, it is arguable that even
greater recognition of judicial competence over section 301 actions would be
appropriate.
All of the considerations which support judicial competence to enforce
directly the substantive provisions of a contract despite their possible overlap
with the LMRA apply where the aid of a court is invoked to support the
arbitration process in an action to compel observance of either an agreement to
arbitrate or an arbitration award. There are, moreover, additional reasons for
sanctioning judicial competence to support the arbitration process notwithstanding overlap. The widespread use of the arbitration mechanism as "an
instrument of self-government" is persuasive evidence of its utility. Arbitration
has, moreover, been endorsed not only by the LMRA but also by the Board.
Thus, the Board, which has been extremely jealous of its jurisdiction in noncontractual matters, has not sought to displace arbitral jurisdiction in cases of
overlap. On the contrary, it has relinquished its own jurisdiction in deference
to arbitration-a self-denial which is striking in view of the provisions of
Subsection 10(a) of the LMRA. Although the Board's decisions involve uncertainties, they indicate generally that even though alleged contractual violations are or may be statutory violations, contractually prescribed arbitral
258. International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237
(1952).
259. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
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procedures should be exhausted prior to recourse to the Board. 20° And where
an arbitrator has adjudicated an issue within the Board's jurisdiction, the
Board will in general stay its hand unless intervention is necessary to remedy
procedural unfairness in the arbitration process or to reverse a result repugnant to statutory policies. 261 The Board has thus recognized that the national
policy entrusts the responsibility for securing performance of contractual obligations to other tribunals. It has, moreover, recognized the special values of the
arbitration process. The Board's approach represents an appropriate adjustment between those values and the desirability of protecting the basic standards
embodied in the national scheme. It gives the mechanism agreed to by the
parties full scope and yet permits correction of procedural abuse or departures
from the federal standards by the exercise of the Board's paramount power.
Similar considerations justify the preservation of judicial competence to aid
the arbitration process despite the fact that the underlying conduct to be
arbitrated may involve statutory as well as contractual prohibitions.
It may be urged, however, that the values of arbitration depend essentially on the parties' willingness to use it after a particular controversy has
arisen. This contention reflects the concern expressed by thoughtful students
that judicial action compelling recourse to the contractually prescribed arbitral
procedures threatens the values of arbitration as a self-operating instrument
of self-government. 262 It is not necessary here to explore the merits of that
position or to elaborate the interesting contrast between it and the long search
for obligatory jurisdiction and the "rule of law" in the international sphere.
It is sufficient to note that Lincoln Mills has declared that the national policy
favors the use of judicial power to compel the parties to use arbitral machinery
prescribed by the contract. The exclusion of judicial competence because of
overlap not only would undercut that policy, but might also result in an
artificial fragmentation of the arbitrator's jurisdiction and the intrusion of
unnecessary technicalities into grievance adjustment.
A concrete situation will illustrate these difficulties. A typical contractual
provision prohibiting employer discrimination against employees on account
of their union activities duplicates the prohibition of subsection 8(a) (3) of
the LMRA. Evidence which established or negated the violation of the contract provisions would (questions of burden of persuasion aside) presuppose
the same result under the statute. But a collective bargaining agreement would
typically contain another provision protecting employees against discharge
260. See Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 705-06 (1943), nforced,
141 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1944); Address by Board Member Jenkins, entitled "The
Peacemakers," Arbitration and Industrial Relations Conference, Fort Worth, Texas,
Nov. 19, 1957, at 10-11, on file in University of Chicago Law School Library and available from Public Information Division of the NLRB.
261. New Britain Mach. Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 645 (1956), rcVd sub norn. International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 247 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Spielberg Mfg. Co.,
112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
262. See Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv.
999, 1024 (1955).
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without "just cause." The Board does not, however, police discharges lacking
"just cause" unless they are connected with employee participation in or
abstention from union (or related) activities.
Under the contract described above, if an employee's discharge were
questioned, the issues before the arbitrator would not be the same as those
before the Board in an unfair labor practice proceeding. It is true that both
the Board and the arbitrator would have to decide whether discrimination
had entered into the discharge. But for the Board, unlike the arbitrator,
that would be the only issue in the case. Once the Board rejected the charge
of discrimination, it would have no jurisdiction over the issue of employee
misconduct and the appropriateness of discharge as a penalty. The arbitrator,
after finding no discrimination, would, however, be faced with such issues.
The arbitral and administrative jurisdiction could be divided with the
arbitrator empowered to pass only on the issue of "just cause" and with the
Board retaining exclusive jurisdiction over issues of discrimination. Although
the issues involved have been fragmented in this way to avoid the overlap
issue, 2 3 such fragmentation plainly involves an artificial separation between
two interrelated questions. In any close arbitration case the existence of discrimination would manifestly affect the determination of "just cause" and
would be there litigated even if the arbitrator theoretically lacked jurisdiction
to resolve the discrimination issue. Neither the statute nor policy considerations
warrant the artificial fragmentation of two related issues or a division of
jurisdiction which would call for two proceedings before both issues could
be resolved.2 64 Nor is there any justification for a rule which might require
parties to draft grievances so as to make it clear that the issues of contract
interpretation submitted to the grievance procedure do not overlap with
questions of unfair labor practices. Such technical niceties are wholly inappropriate to the informality of the grievance process, but they would become
important if arbitral jurisdiction, or judicial competence to direct arbitration,
were ousted by overlap.
2. Judicial competence over a defense based on the alleged commission
of an unfair labor practice. Somewhat greater difficulties in adjusting judicial
and administrative competence are involved when a defense against an alleged
breach of contract rests on the contention that the apparent breach was provoked, and thus rendered privileged, by the plaintiff's antecedent unfair labor
265
illuspractice. The problem suggested by Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB
263. See McAmis v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 273 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. Ct. App.

1954).
264. Cf. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
265. 350 U.S. 270 (1956). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with whom Justices Minton and

Harlan concurred, dissented on the ground that the strike, although in response to
employer unfair labor practices, was subject to the waiting period and other requirements
prescribed by § 8(d) and that that section precluded reinstatement of the striking employees.
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trates the difficulties involved. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that
a no-strike clause which in general terms barred all strikes did not apply
to a strike in response to the employer's serious unfair labor practices which
jeopardized the union's status. The Court, accordingly, characterized the
strikers' conduct as protected and sustained a Board order reinstating strikers
who had been discharged.
Antecedent unfair labor practices, such as those involved in Mastro
Plastics, might be invoked as a defense to an action against a union for
damages or injunctive relief based on a breach of contract. The question
would then arise as to whether the court itself should determine whether
such unfair labor practices were committed or whether it should require the
union to raise that issue by filing a charge with the Board, staying the contract action pending an administrative determination. The doctrine of "primary
jurisdiction" appears at first glance to call for the reference of such specialized
questions to the Board,266 at least where the statute of limitations has not
run and the Board's jurisdictional yardsticks are satisfied. But further analysis
suggests doubt as to such a result.
When a union urges that a general no-strike pledge does not bar a
strike prompted by particular conduct, the basic issue is not the proper
characterization of the employer's conduct under the LMRA. The issue is
whether the employer's conduct is of such character as to justify a construction of the no-strike clause which renders it inapplicable to the strike
in question. A no-strike clause may, of course, be inapplicable even though
no employer unfair labor practice is involved; for example, when a strike
occurs during the term of a contract after an impasse produced by negotiations concerning wages under a reopening clause. On the other hand, a
no-strike clause may be applicable despite the presence of employer unfair
practices; for example, where a no-strike clause specifically applies to strikes
caused by unfair labor practices. 67 Accordingly, what is decisive in the hypothetical contract action is not the characterization of the employer's or the
employees' conduct under the LMRA, but an appraisal of the relationship of
such conduct to the purposes which can reasonably be imputed to the parties.
266. This procedure is recommended in Note, 66 YALE L.J. 284, 291 n.40 (1956).

For a thoughtful general discussion of "primary jurisdiction" see Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered: The Anti-trust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 577 (1954).
267. It is true that the Court in Mastro Plastics obliquely questioned the validity
of a clause barring strikes during the term of an agreement which were provoked by
antecedent employer unfair practices. 350 U.S. at 283. But the difficulties of distinguishing between unfair labor practice strikes and economic strikes and the availability of the
Board's machinery for the correction of unfair labor practices would appear to be ample
grounds for sustaining the parties' agreement to forego all use of economic pressure during the contract term. The validation of such a broad no-strike clause would make clear
that the basic issue before the courts would be interpretation of the contract rather than
of the Board's doctrines as to protected activity.
This formulation of the issue appears to be supported by the limitation recently
engrafted on the Mastro Plastics doctrine by the Board's decision in Mid-West Metallic
Prods., Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. No. 164 (Oct. 14, 1958). In that case, a strike protesting a
discriminatory discharge was held to be unprotected because it was contrary to a con-
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If, as the foregoing discussion suggests, the basic issue in a section 301
action turns on the application of contract doctrine, courts should be free
to dispose of such actions without waiting for an NLRB characterization of
employer or employee conduct under the LMRA. Indeed, the position urged
above implies that courts in such actions should be free to ignore previous
Board characterization of the particular conduct in issue. Such an approach,
it is true, permits the same conduct to be subject to different and conflicting
characterizations by the Board and the courts, respectively, and permits the
courts to interfere with conduct previously characterized by the Board as
protected. 268 But such Board characterizations should not be binding on
courts authorized by section 301 to make determinations concerning the reach
of the contract. The resultant differences, like those involved in discordant
Board and court determinations under subsection 8(b) (4) and section 303,
respectively, could properly be dismissed as the inescapable result of authorizing different tribunals to adjudicate the same conduct for different
purposes 2 9
Whatever the force of the foregoing analysis, or its applicability to other
situations, 270 other considerations of convenience and policy suggest the undesirability of fragmenting jurisdiction when unfair labor practices are urged
as a defense in an action on a collective bargaining agreement. The Board's
machinery has been subject to great delays, which may be increased by the
,recent expansion of the Board's jurisdiction. The fragmentation of jurisdic-tion would import such delays into contract actions. Thus, in all actions on
no-strike pledges, defendant unions might attempt to postpone judicial relief
by defenses (meritorious and frivolous) based on alleged unfair practices by
the employer. Delay is particularly undesirable in connection with any action
to enforce collective bargaining agreements because of the adverse impact of
such actions on the parties' continuing relationship and on subsequent negotiations. In the case of actions for injunctive relief against strikes and lockouts,
there are, of course, additional reasons for avoiding the pyramiding of delays.
If the Supreme Court should sanction such injunctive relief notwithstanding
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, its decision would reflect the judgment that the
tractual provision barring strikes until the exhaustion of the grievance procedure. The
Board distinguished Mastro Plastics on the ground that a grievance could be processed
in five days and that the antecedent unfair labor practice did not threaten the union's
existence. Accordingly, it dispensed with the requirement, announced by both the Board
and the Court in Mastro Plastics, of an "explicit waiver" of the right to strike against
an unfair labor practice.
268. But cf. 58 COLJM". L. Rav. 278, 279 (1958).
269. The recognition that §301 jurisdiction is independent of NLRB jurisdiction
will give rise to questions as to the effect to be given by one forum to prior determinations
made in another forum. Compare Meltzer, supra note 256, at 35 n.112.
270. Thus the parties might attempt to invite Board determinations concerning
rights under their agreement by embodying statutory standards therein. A no-strike
clause might, for example, expressly be inapplicable to strikes provoked by antecedent employer unfair labor practices. Such a clause would appear to make liability
under the no-strike clause dependent on whether the employer's conduct had violated
the statutory provisions defining unfair labor practices. And it is arguable that such a
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national labor policy calls for a prompt preventive remedy. To defeat such
a remedy because of concern for the Board's primary jurisdiction would
hardly yield a coherent policy.
3. Competence over matters which peculiarly involve NLRB expertise.
The contract actions discussed above all involve situations in which the
basic issue turns on the meaning or applicability of contractual provisions.
More troublesome questions of accommodation between judicial and administrative competence are raised where the result in a contract action turns (a)
on whether a particular contract clause violates the provisions of the LMRA,
or (b) on questions of representation.
Such matters involve the specialized insights attributed to the Board
rather than the more general insights about the institution of contract attributed
to the courts. For example, an employer may defend against an action to
restrain or to grant damages for his violation of a union shop clause coupled
with a checkoff provision. The issue before the court is whether the union
shop arrangement satisfies the statutory requirements, i.e., whether the provision on its face or in its application constitutes an unfair labor practice.
In such situations, a strong case can be made for the invocation of primary
jurisdiction. On the other hand, section 303 again may be invoked as an
indication that where judicial competence is recognized by the statute such
competence is not to be fragmented in order to protect the Board's jurisdiction. There is no apparent reason for permitting the courts under section
303 to deal with the complex and vague proscriptions of secondary boycotts
while denying their competence to pass on other provisions which may invalidate contract clauses invoked in an action under section 301.
There is no easy escape from the dilemma. The recognition of complete
judicial competence to deal with all questions raised by section 301 actions
will run the risk of results incompatible with, and subject to nullification by,
Board determinations. The fragmentation of judicial competence by the invocation of primary jurisdiction will subject the plaintiff to delays in an area
where stability in labor relations calls for a prompt remedy. Although the
problem is scarcely an invitation to dogmatism, the importance of a prompt
remedy, the implications of the Court's recognition of independent judicial
determination should be made by the NLRB rather than by the courts, at least in situations where the Board's jurisdictional standards, the LMRA's statute of limitation, and
other requirements for the use of the Board's machinery could be satisfied. Despite the
parties' incorporation of statutory standards in their agreement, the basic issue is one of
the construction and application of the contract. If the LMRA is read as remitting
such questions to the courts, it is doubtful that the parties' agreement should be permitted
to change the legislative allocation of authority.
The argument that the basic issue involved is contractual is subject to the qualification
that the contractual issue may turn on expectations flowing from the statute. Lincoln Mills
implies, however, judicial competence to deal with such statutory issues enmeshed in
contract actions.
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competence under section 303, and the provision for an apparently similar
competence under section 301, may justify the rejection of "primary jurisdiction" in actions involving the validity of a contract clause under the LMRA.
In any event, this approach apparently has the persuasive support of Judge
271
Magruder, speaking for the First Circuit.
The difficulties of accommodating administrative and judicial competence
in section 301 actions are most acute when the validity of an agreement or its
enforceability turns on a question of representation. For example, such questions would be decisive in the following situations: (1) A defendant (employer
or union) may urge that the contracting but uncertified union lacked majority
support in the appropriate unit when the agreement was executed and that
the agreement was consequently invalid. 272 Such questions involve complex
administrative standards governing unit determinations and the indicia of
majority support-matters which peculiarly involve the Board's expertise.
(2) During the term of a contract valid ab initio, the employees of the unit
involved may shift their allegiance to a rival union. Such a shift may produce
problems as to which union is entitled to administer the old contract. Furthermore, if the employer recognizes and contracts with the rival, there will
be problems as to the effect of this action on the predecessor's rights under
the old contract.
Where the successor union has been certified by the NLRB, the courts
can generally resolve issues concerning the right to enforce the old contract
or the right to enforce a later and inconsistent contract without invoking
rules within the Board's special competence.2 7 3 Indeed, the Board has abstained from determining such contractual issues even when directing a
representation election at a time prior to the expiration of an existing col271. International Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576,
581-82 (1st Cir.) (dictum), petition for cert. dismissed per stipulation, 352 U.S. 802
(1956). In Ferguson Steere Motor Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 223 F.2d
842 (5th Cir. 1955), the court held, however, that federal district courts lack jurisdiction

to grant a declaratory judgment that a contract had been renewed by its terms. The
grounds for decision were (1) jurisdiction was barred by Westinghouse and (2) the
issue involved was peculiarly within the Board's jurisdiction under § 8(d), which together
with § 301 had been invoked as a source of jurisdiction by the plaintiff. Westinghouse
is a doubtful basis for denying jurisdiction where the issue is the existence of a contract
rather than the union's capacity to enforce "personal" rights thereunder. The second
ground for the decision is equally doubtful. Contrary to the court's assumption, the
issue as to whether an automatic renewal clause is operative is distinct from the issue
as to whether a union has violated § 8(b) (3) by noncompliance with § 8(d). See International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Dahlem Const. Co., 193 F.2d 470, 473-74 (6th
Cir. 1951).
272. This position has been adopted by the Board. Adam D. Goettl, 104 N.L.R.B.
1076 (1953).
273. In Modine Mfg. Co. v. Grand Lodge Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 216 F.2d 326
(6th Cir. 1954), a certified union had executed a contract containing union shop and
checkoff provisions. Prior to the expiration of the contract, the NLRB certified another
union as the representative of the bargaining unit. The Sixth Circuit upheld the district

court's jurisdiction under § 301 to determine whether the displaced union was entitled
to enforce the provisions described above even though the contractural issue depended on
the provisions of the LMRA governing the employer's duty to bargain and other related

duties vis-A-vis a newly certified union.
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lective agreement. 2 74 The recognition of judicial competence over such issues
is accordingly necessary to avoid a vacuum.
If, however, no such certification has occurred, determination of rights
to enforce the first contract or the effect of a later contract between the
employer and an alleged successor union depends on complex and shifting
administrative standards regarding "schism," the lifting of "the contract bar,"
7
doctrine.27 6 Although a full treatment of these
and the Midwest Piping=
matters is not appropriate here, several observations are in order: The controlling standards peculiarly involve the Board's expertise and give rise to
problems which courts of general jurisdiction may find esoteric and troublesome.277 Furthermore, determinations concerning breach of contract which
involve such issues could be nullified by the exercise of the Board's paramount
power. Such considerations make a strong case for the invocation of primary

jurisdiction.
274. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (Sept. 18, 1958). See also
American Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250, 254 (1954).
275. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
276. See generally Freidin, The Board, The "Bar," and The Bargain, 59 CoLum. L.
Rav. 61 (1959).
277. In International Union, United Industrial Workers v. Star Prods. Co., 16 Ill.
App. 2d 321, 148 N.E.2d 43 (1958), plaintiff union and defendant employer entered into
a contract which contained a checkoff provision and apparently a union security provision.
Before the contract expired, some members of plaintiff union joined a rival union. The
employer and the rival, which had not been certified by the NLRB, entered into a contract
inconsistent with the plaintiff's unexpired contract. Plaintiff petitioned the state court
for a declaration that its contract was "valid from its inception" and for any further
appropriate relief. The trial court dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The appellate court,
sustaining the judgment, urged that (1) the original validity of the contract depended
on questions as to majority status and the appropriate unit, which, it implied, were within
the Board's exclusive competence; (2) the validity of the second and inconsistent contract
depended on the application of § 8(a) (5) and the application of the "schism doctrine";
since the continued force of the first contract also involved these issues, which were
appropriate for Board determination, the trial court lacked jurisdiction (semble) ; and
(3) as a result of the Board's, i.e., the regional director's, refusal to issue a complaint on
the ground of "insuffcient' evidence of statutory violations, the issues as to the validity
of the first contract were res judicata.
It should be noted that the court's first ground would appear to destroy judicial
competence under § 301 unless the contracting union had been certified within a year of the
execution of the contract relied upon. But see International Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL v.
W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576, 581-82 (1st Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed per stipulation, 352 U.S. 802 (1956). Furthermore, in Westinghouse Mr. Justice Frankfurter
declared that "in such actions [under § 301], the validity of the agreement may be
challenged on federal grounds-that the labor organization negotiating it was not the
representative of the employees involved, or that subsequent changes in the representative
status of the union have affected the continued validity of the agreement." 348 U.S. at 451.
The supporting citation was "cf. La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 336 U.S. 18," which recognized the Board's exclusive jurisdiction over
representation questions. Query whether "cf." implies judicial competence over such
questions in the context of § 301 actions?
The reliance on res judicata in the Star Products case appears to raise serious constitutional difficulties, which can only be mentioned briefly. The court's approach would
permit plaintiff's alleged contract rights to be destroyed on the basis of an ex parte
administrative investigation, in which neither the plaintiff nor anyone else is accorded
the substance of a fair hearing. It is true that the plaintiff's interest in a statutory
remedy may be destroyed by similar administrative determinations, but it does not follow
that asserted contract rights, whose enforcement generally depends on the plaintiff's
initiative, can constitutionally be destroyed in the same fashion. See Graybar Elec. Co. v.
Automotive Employees, 365 Mo. 753, 771, 287 S.W.2d 794, 804 (1956) (dissenting
opinion).
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It is possible, however, to read section 301 as a somewhat oblique rejection of that doctrine. That section applies to "suits for violations of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce." (Emphasis added.) This language is extremely
puzzling: It does not make clear whether the union is required to have
representation status (1) as of the time of suit, (2) at the time the agreement was executed, or (3) as of such time or times as are relevant in the
light of the issues to be litigated. But the third-mentioned approach to this
ambiguity seems to be consistent with the mandate of Lincoln Mills, that contract issues be resolved in the light of the policy of the national labor laws.
Another ambiguity of the quoted language is more important in relation to
primary jurisdiction: Does the inclusion of the reference to representation
in a section creating judicial competence imply that the courts, rather than
the Board, are to resolve representation issues relevant to contract litigation?
That view has been advanced by Judge Magruder, speaking for the First
Circuit.278 It is doubtful, however, that the puzzling language of section 301

would justify the rejection of primary jurisdiction if its application appears
justified by an appraisal of the competing interests. Indeed, the language
quoted above may be dismissed as disclosing nothing about the legislative
purpose concerning a relatively sophisticated concept, primary jurisdiction;
that language, after all, may be read as involving only an inartistically executed
effort to limit section 301 to cases "involving commerce." Such a construction
is supported by the fact that the quoted language may be read as not referring
to majority status since a union lacking such status may nevertheless enter
into a valid "members only" agreement.
The distinctions suggested above between issues of contract interpretation
and genuine issues of primary jurisdiction in actions on collective bargaining
agreements are complex. Perhaps they are unduly complex. Perhaps the
complexities should be avoided by reading section 301 as a mandate to the
courts to decide whatever unresolved issues must be decided to dispose of a
claim for breach of contract. Such an expansive view of judicial power would
involve the courts in difficult and specialized issues,2 79 but it would also reduce
the possibility that undue preoccupation with so-called "expertise" and with
"uniformity" would result in the denial of prompt and comprehensive relief
and, in some cases, the denial of any relief.
4. Judicial enforcement of no-raiding agreements. In an attempt to
resolve troublesome jurisdictional rivalries, organized labor has employed
278. International Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576,
581-82 (1st Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed per stipulation, 352 U.S. 802 (1956).
279. In exercising equity jurisdiction in § 301 actions, courts will presumably apply
conventional doctrines under which relief may be withheld as a matter of discretion where
an alternative and adequate remedy exists or where equitable relief may be nullified in
another forum. Although similar considerations enter into the application of "primary
jurisdiction," the canons of equity would appear to import considerably more flexibility.

HeinOnline -- 59 Colum. L. Rev. 295 1959

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

no-raiding pacts, which purport to allocate representation and organizational
rights and which provide for the settlement of conflicting representation claims
by arbitration.2 8 0 Section 301 by its terms extends judicial power to such
interunion agreements. But specific enforcement of such agreements by the
courts gives rise to troublesome difficulties. Such enforcement may bar
unions from recourse to the representation machinery of the Board despite
the fact that the Board is of the view that that machinery should be open
even to unions who invoke it in violation of their contractual obligations.
The pertinent difficulties and potentialities for conflict between the courts and
the Board are illustrated by the Personal Products litigation.
The Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA) filed with the Board
a petition for an election among the employees of the company's Chicago
plant, who had been represented by the United Textile Workers of America
(UTW). Several months after a Board hearing on this petition, the impartial umpire under the AFL-CIO no-raiding agreement ruled that TWUA
had violated that agreement by its organizational campaign and by its filing
of an election petition with the Board.28 Under that agreement, that ruling
required TWUA to withdraw its petition and its recognition demand, but
TWUA ignored that requirement. The Board, rejecting UTW's objections
based on the no-raiding agreement and the umpire's award, directed an
election.
Several days before the election, UTW secured a temporary order from
a federal district court directing TWUA to withdraw its representation
petition and to comply generally with the arbitration awardf28 2 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued an interim ruling suspending
that order. The Board, at the parties' request, thereupon indefinitely postponed an election. Subsequently, eleven months after the petition for election
and four months after the direction of an election, the court of appeals,
invoking section 301, as had the trial court, vacated its interim order and
affirmed the judgment below. 2 83

The court of appeals had declined to permit

280. For a useful discussion of these agreements see Aaron, Interundon Representlation Disputes and the NLRB, 36 TEXAs L. REv. 846, 851-56 (1958).
281. United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers, 30 Lab. Arb. 244 (1958).
282. United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers, 42 L.R.R.M. 2066 (N.D. Ill. 1958).
283. United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1958), 59
COLum. L. REv. 202 (1959). The court of appeals did not specifically refer to the NorrisLaGuardia Act but relied generally on Lincoln Mills as justifying its enforcement of
arbitration clauses in interunion agreements. The point emphasized in Lincoln Mills,
that arbitration clauses are the quid pro quo for no-strike clauses, is plainly inapplicable
in the context of interunion agreements. But the failure to arbitrate interunion representation disputes, as much as the failure to arbitrate grievances under collective argaining agreements, was "not a part and parcel of the abuses against which the [NorrisLaGuardia] Act was aimed." 353 U.S. at 458. Furthermore, enforcement of interunion
arbitration clauses is not incompatible with the specific prohibitions of § 4 of NorrisLaGuardia. Accordingly, the extension of Lincoln Mills to this context, although not
free from doubt, seems appropriate.
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the Board to intervene or to file a brief as amicus curiae, and had returned
284
the brief tendered by the Board.

Four months after that affirmance, the Board granted UTW's request
to withdraw its petition, noting in a brief opinion that that request, which
had not been supported by any reasons, presumably had been prompted by
the court order.28 5 The Board explicitly declined to acquiesce in the position
of the Seventh Circuit and added that in the future it would expect to be
made a party to court actions brought to restrain a party from appearing
on a ballot "as directed by the Board"; and that otherwise it would be
disposed to deny requests for withdrawal of election petitions made pursuant
to a court order. 28 6 Two members of the Board disassociated themselves from
these comments.
Personal Products highlights two distinct, but related, problems: (1) the
respective powers of the courts and the Board with respect to private agreements which are designed to restrict access to the statutory representation
machinery; and (2) the judicial and administrative methods which might
appropriately be followed, as a matter of comity, for the purpose of reducing
collisions between the courts and the Board when both tribunals are asserting
independent jurisdiction of what is, in fact, if not in form, the same subject
matter. It is to these questions which we now turn.
No-raiding pacts appear to be the principal kind of interunion agreements
brought within judicial competence by section 301.287 Accordingly, the denial
of judicial power to enforce such agreements would appear to involve a sub284. This information was supplied by Mozart Ratner, Esq., counsel for the UTW
in the Personal Products litigation, together with the information that he had advised
the court that he consented to the Board's appearing as amicus.
285. Personal Prods. Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (Dec. 18, 1958).

286. Presumably, the Board did not insist on being made a party at the arbitration
stage because the only function of the arbitrator is to apply the agreement and not to
determine whether its application is compatible with the basic statutory policies.
287. The words "or between any such labor organizations" were added to § 301 in
conference. See 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
ACT, 1947, at 279 (1948); 2 id. at 1543. The legislative history does not spell out the
reasons for that addition.
The precise content to be given to "labor organizations" as used in § 301 is far from
clear; nor does the statute or its history provide a standard for resolving this ambiguity. The phrase could be extended to suits involving an international and a constituent
local or a former local which has sought to disaffiliate from the international, on the
ground that each is a distinct labor organization. Cf. NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co.,
341 U. S. 322 (1951), which dealt, however, with a different problem. But lower federal
courts have tended to reject such an expansive reading of the statute and have generally
held it inapplicable to disputes over property arising from disaffiliation controversies.
See cases cited in 59 CoLum. L. REv. 202, 203 nn.14-19 (1959). Such holdings have
sometimes ignored the fact that the controversy embraced issues concerning the impact
of a collective bargaining agreement. See Sun Shipbuilding & Dry-Dock Co. v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 95 F. Supp. 50, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1950). But see Local 1104,
United Elec. Workers v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 109 F. Supp. 675, 683-84 (E.D. Mo.
1952). In view of the uncertainties concerning the applicability of § 301 to contractual
disputes which could be said to be intra-union, its main coverage would seem to be
agreements between two internationals (or two locals of different internationals) concerning representation and work-assignment claims.
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stantial frustration of the purpose behind the language providing for judicial
competence over interunion agreements. But difficulties would also result
from recognition of such power since judicial enforcement would control access
to the statutory machinery and would limit the Board in balancing competing
statutory objectives in an area which has been considered to fall peculiarly
within its expertise.2 88
It is arguable that the apparent collision between judicial and administrative competence is unreal because the courts' determination of the contractual
issues need not bind the Board in its administration of the representation
machinery. Accordingly, each tribunal would be master in its own area of
competence, as defined by or implied by the statute. But such an argument
ignores a vital consideration, viz., that litigation in this context is designed
to block access to the Board's machinery or to nullify the consequences of
Board action. Consequently, judicial barriers to resort to the Board could,
in effect, destroy pro tanto the Board's competence. Furthermore, if the courts,
by enforcing no-raiding pacts, may block resort to the Board, presumably
they could also nullify representation rights confirmed by a Board certification
resulting from contractually proscribed union action. Thus, for example, in
Personal Products, if the Board had denied the offending union's motion for
withdrawal of its election petition and had ultimately certified it, certification
would plainly have frustrated the purpose of the judicial decree. Under such
circumstances, if judicial competence were independent of the Board action,
the court would presumably have had (and would have exercised) the corollary
power to protect the integrity of its processes by enjoining the offending union
from exercising the representation authority confirmed by the Board's certification. Board nullification of judicial action would, moreover, undoubtedly move
the courts to expand the scope of their preventive relief in the first instance,
so as to bar the exercise of any representation powers in contravention of the
pertinent no-raiding pact. Such relief before or after certification could also
serve to prevent or nullify avoidance or evasion of no-raiding pacts through
election petitions filed by employees rather than unions.
Thus, in the representation, as opposed to the unfair labor practice, context, separate spheres of judicial and administrative competence cannot be
neatly delineated because-it is worth repeating-the basic purpose and effect
of judicial action is to preclude resort to the Board's machinery or to nullify
the representation rights confirmed by its use. Accordingly, either the Board
or the courts must be recognized as having paramount authority in this context.
The language of the LMRA does not settle the problem of which tribunal
is master. Subsection 301(a) is a general grant of power, to be exercised in
288. Cf. Meltzer, supra note 256, at 9 n.20.
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accordance with the policies of the federal labor laws. Since one such policy
has been the Board's exclusive power over representation matters, judicial
action could be subordinated to the Board's policies and would, if in conflict, be
invalidated. Appealing as this result is, it would, as already indicated, drain
section 301, insofar as it is applicable to interunion agreements, of much of its
vitality. Furthermore, it would run counter to the heavy reliance which the
statute places on voluntary mechanisms in connection with the settlement of
work-assignment disputes, which are closely related to representation
2 89
disputes.
As to the Board, nothing in the statute specifies how its powers under
section 9 should be dovetailed with judicial action under section 301. Subsection 10(a), which grants it plenary powers with respect to unfair labor
practices, does not expressly apply to representation matters. An inclusio unius
argument, in this complex context, would, however, be a barren exercise in
word chopping. No reason appears for granting the Board plenary power to
override arbitration and judicial decrees impinging on unfair labor practices
while denying such power in the representation context. On the contrary,
representation matters would appear to present an especially appealing case
for recognizing the Board's plenary power.
Policing of the representation machinery has been committed largely to
the Board. The controlling policies have evolved largely from the exercise
of the broad discretion accorded to it by the courts and the Taft-Hartley
Congress. Its determinations are, moreover, largely insulated against direct
judicial review.290 Finally, its facilities are superior to those of the courts
for determining the effect and the value of no-raiding pacts and integrating
them with the statutory machinery. Under these circumstances, indirect
judicial control over the Board's machinery, by way of equitable enforcement
of no-raiding pacts, would involve an incongruous and disrupting departure
from the basic pattern of the statute. It would either bring the Board and
the courts into direct conflict in which courts, by virtue of their broad equity
powers, would prevail, or it would subordinate Board action to judicial determinations in an area which demands all of the special insights and expertise
imputed to the Board.
Such results could be avoided either by denying judicial power specifically
to enforce no-raiding pacts, or by a rigorous limitation of that power in order
289. See § 10(k) of the LMRA; Wood Lathers Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 1345,
1352-53 (1958) ; NLRB, Rules and Regulations and Statement of Procedure, 29 C.F.R.
§§ 102.79-.83 (Supp. 1959).
290. Cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). Nevertheless, a union aggrieved
by the Board's disregard of a no-raiding pact and its consequent certification of a rival
could secure judicial review indirectly by taking action leading to a Board determination
that the union had violated § 8(b) (4) (c). Cf. NLRB v. National Plastic Prods. Co.,
175 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1949).
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to prevent its exercise from interfering with the Board's representation
machinery. Under the second alternative, courts, although competent to compel
arbitration pursuant to no-raiding pacts, would be disabled from enforcing
arbitration awards by blocking access to the Board's machinery or by nullifying
its results. Arbitration in this context would thus depend on its moral impact
plus such informal influence as organized labor could bring to bear on unions
offending against no-raiding pacts.
Although the difficulties involved present no occasion for dogmatism, the
second alternative seems the preferable one. It would utilize the arbitration
mechanism in the settlement of representation disputes while leaving the Board
20 1
free to integrate arbitration awards with its total representation policy.
It is true that the adoption of this approach and the consequent unenforceability,
under section 301, of these arbitral awards might result in disparagement of
the arbitration process and would involve the risk of judicial action beyond
the limits suggested above. But these risks seem to be justified by the contribution which might flow from arbitration and by the desirability of giving some
force to the provisions of section 301 with respect to interunion agreements.
The difficulties and uncertainties surrounding Board and judicial power
with respect to no-raiding pacts made it particularly desirable in Personal
Products for both tribunals to be sensitive to the demands of comity. The
performance of both tribunals on this score left something to be desired. The
court of appeals rejected the Board's request to act as amicus curiae as well as
its request to intervene. The Board's failure to request intervention until the
case was on appeal warranted the denial of that request. 292 But the disposition
of the amicus request was questionable given the consent by counsel for the
UTW to the Board's acting as amicus, the rationale of Lincoln Mills, the
involvement of the Board's responsibilities, and the light the Board might have
shed on new and difficult problems. The court's brusque rejection of the
Board's views had, on the surface, a quality of churlishness especially inappropriate in an area requiring novel and delicate jurisdictional adjustments.
As for the Board, in Personal Products it did not, in my opinion, adequately support its disregard of the arbitration process. Even though its
paramount power is conceded, its approach would plainly undermine the
effort of the union movement, through private agreement, to curb jurisdic291. Cf. notes 260-61 supra and accompanying text. It is true that the Board could
be said to have followed such an approach in Personal Products. But its reliance on
an abstract and unqualified concept of "free choice" has been properly and effectively
criticized as ignoring the limitations on such choice resulting from the history of particular unions and from the need to protect competing interests. See Aaron, supra note
280, at 858-61. If reliance on such abstractions were abandoned, the Board could usefully shift its emphasis to more concrete considerations, such as the failure of the union
which had prevailed in arbitration to discharge its duty of fair representation or to
observe the statutory union shop restrictions.
292. See 4 MooRi, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 1124.13 (2d ed. 1950).
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tional rivalries, which have been an unruly and long-standing source of
difficulties for organized labor, neutral employees, and the public. The problem of integrating such agreements with the statutory scheme called for a
careful assessment of the effects of the private machinery on the facts of
industrial life. The Board presented no such assessment in the judicial or
administrative phases of Personal Products. It relied instead on a broad
and abstract concept of free choice for employees in the choice of their bargaining representative; it passed over the fact that in other contexts it has
limited such choice to promote other interests; and it offered no enlightenment
as to why contractual mechanisms should be respected in connection with
work-assignment disputes but ignored with respect to representation disputes. 293 Its approach has been the subject of comprehensive and wise
criticism elsewhere. 294 Here it is sufficient to add only that the Board's failure
to assess the institutional impact of no-raiding pacts was wholly inappropriate
for an agency invoking its own expertise as the basis for denying or claiming
the right to override judicial power, which section 301 purports to recognize.
XI.

CONCLUSION

Those whose patience has brought them this far may feel a sense of
despair about the complexities and the paradoxes involved in the accommodations between federal and state power over labor relations (or involved
at least in this article). In a period bristling with primitive denunciation
of the Supreme Court, it is worth repeating that these problems are not the
Court's invention. They result in part from the complexities of a federal
system, which are magnified in a "field" such as labor relations, which
intersects with so many activities and involves such diverse forms of regulation. They result also from the default of Congress with respect to
fundamental issues whose solution determines how and by whom a modern
economy should be governed and, indeed, in some situations, whether it is
to be governed at all.
In the context of labor relations, the judicial process is a doubtful
instrument for filling the policy and power vacuum left by Congress. The
problems involved are highly charged and political in every legitimate sense.
Under the current statute, the Court, no matter how it decides, cannot escape
the charge that it is preferring one powerful interest over another, or one
of two competing faiths about the contemporary role of state as opposed to
federal power. Labor relations issues do not, moreover, lend themselves to
solution by comprehensive formulas which the Court tends to lay down
293. In this connection, it should be noted that in some cases the settlement of a
work-assignment dispute may, for practical purposes, dispose of any representation
question.
294. See Aaron, supra note 280, at 858-61.
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to reduce case-by-case tests of pre-emption and to rationalize policy judgments
in terms of the legislative will. Thus, for example, the role of the states with
respect to strikes for higher wages might well be different from their role
as to strikes to impose geographical trade barriers or to prevent technological
innovation. But the Court's formulas and the Court's processes are generally
0 5
Even
not adequate to the task of making such functional adjustments.
when the pressures of particular situations produce such adjustments, they
frequently appear to fracture the emerging logic of the Court's precedents.
Whatever their ad hoc merit, they invite familiar outcries: The Court is
sacrificing the traditions of humility and craftsmanship, which subordinate
results to method; it is assuming the prerogative of a third chamber; it is
converting litigation into a game of chance.
Such difficulties are, of course, part of the burden of adjudication, particularly federalist adjudication. But their current multiplication, through
congressional default, has in the context of labor relations created avoidable
and costly internal and external strains on the Court, and has produced
results, such as Guss, which no rational legislature, and no rational Court,
free from the compulsions discovered in its precedents and in a murky statute,
would decree.
It may be that, despite the defects of the judicial process, the issues of
federalism in labor relations must be left to the Court because they are too
complex and controversial for legislative determination. Certainly, the lack
of federalist sophistication in the Taft-Hartley Congress and the subsequent
legislative paralysis support such a judgment. But a decade of litigation and
debate have at least identified many of the principal issues. They now seem
ripe for congressional determination, and they also suggest the areas in which
the Court should be afforded basic guides for federalist accommodation.
An old and vital tradition cautions against an approach to such accommodation which acquiesces in perpetual abdication by the responsible organ of
government. Perhaps the competing assumption that Congress can and will
responsibly turn to the task involved is an act of faith. But such action
appears to be the only possible escape from either continuing disorder in
adjudication or almost total displacement of state power by the Court; and
either choice will further damage the Court's position. Although congressional
solutions may turn out to be "unwise" or inept, they would at least be wise
in the sense that they would reflect a healthy tradition under which basic
political decisions are made and changed by avowedly political agencies.
295. See Hays, Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States, 102 U. PA.
L. REv. 959, 978-79 (1954).
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